

Causal Inference II: Causal Graphs and Estimating Effects

In [Causal Inference I](#) we saw that the naive difference in means equals the true effect *plus selection bias*, and that **randomization** removes that bias. But we often cannot run an experiment:


Lecture Overview

Drawing our assumptions: causal graphs


A **causal graph** is a *directed acyclic graph* (DAG): nodes are variables, and an arrow $X \rightarrow Y$ means “ X is a direct cause of Y ” ([Pearl et al. 2016](#)).

Reading a causal graph

Example DAG: X = exercise, Y = heart health, A = age,
M = motivation, D = diet, W = weight



The three building blocks



Open and blocked paths

A path carries association between its endpoints only if it is **open**. Two rules decide:

The golden rule: adjust for forks, not colliders

The three structures behave *oppositely* when you condition (adjust/stratify) on the middle node:

Structure	Middle node	Adjust for it?	Why
Fork $X \leftarrow Z \rightarrow Y$	confounder	Yes	blocks the spurious backdoor path
Chain $X \rightarrow M \rightarrow Y$	mediator	No*	it's part of the effect you want
Collider $X \rightarrow C \leftarrow Y$	collider	No!	conditioning <i>creates</i> spurious association

* Adjust for a mediator only if you specifically want the *direct* (not total) effect.

Confounders: the backdoor

A **backdoor path** is a non-causal path from X to Y that starts with an arrow *into* X (e.g. $X \leftarrow Z \rightarrow Y$). Backdoor paths are the graph-language for confounding.

The backdoor procedure, by hand

Given a DAG, a treatment X and an outcome Y :

Worked example

Back to the exercise DAG (X = exercise, Y = heart health):

$$A \rightarrow X, A \rightarrow Y, M \rightarrow X, M \rightarrow D, D \rightarrow Y, X \rightarrow W, W \rightarrow Y$$

Your turn: pick the adjustment set

Tutoring (X) and final grade (Y), with: $\text{GPA}_{\text{prior}} \rightarrow X$, $\text{GPA}_{\text{prior}} \rightarrow Y$, $X \rightarrow \text{Hours} \rightarrow Y$, and $X \rightarrow \text{HonorRoll} \leftarrow Y$.

Which of these adjustment sets are valid for the **total** effect of X on Y ?

Colliders: adjusting can *create* bias

Conditioning on a collider (or its descendant) opens a spurious path. Classic example: suppose **talent** and **looks** are independent in the general population, but both help an actor get **famous**.

► Code

```
corr(talent, looks) overall      = +0.00  
corr(talent, looks) among famous = -0.55
```

Mediators: don't “control away” your effect

If a job-training program raises earnings *by* teaching skills:

Training → Skills → Earnings

Estimating effects under “no unmeasured confounders”

Suppose we’ve drawn the DAG and found an adjustment set S that satisfies the backdoor criterion (the **ignorability / unconfoundedness** assumption). Several estimators then recover the effect:

Regression vs. stratification, side by side

► Code

```
True effect      = 3.00
Naive (ignore Z) = 4.65  <- biased
Adjusted (+ Z)   = 3.00  <- recovers truth
```

Propensity scores in one slide

When S is high-dimensional, matching directly is hard. Rosenbaum & Rubin showed it is enough to match/weight on the scalar **propensity score** $e(S) = P(T=1 \mid S)$.

► Code

```
IPW estimate of ATE = 3.03    (true = 3.0)
```


When confounders are *unobserved*: natural experiments

Adjustment only works for confounders we can **measure**. When we can't, we look for “nature's randomization” — sources of variation in treatment that are *as good as random* ([Angrist and Pischke 2014](#)).

Three workhorse designs:

Difference-in-Differences

Compare the **change** in a treated group to the **change** in a control group over time. This differences out any *fixed* differences between the groups.



Instrumental variables & regression discontinuity

Instrumental variable (IV)

An **instrument** Z affects the outcome *only through* the treatment:

$$Z \rightarrow T \rightarrow Y, \quad Z \nrightarrow Y \text{ directly.}$$

- Vietnam **draft lottery** as an instrument for military service.
- **Distance to college** as an instrument for years of schooling.

Z acts like the coin flip we wish we had run.

Regression discontinuity (RD)

Treatment switches on at a **cutoff** of a running variable. Units just above vs. just below are comparable.

- Scholarship awarded at a **test-score threshold**.
- Class-size caps that trigger a new section.

Compare outcomes in a narrow window around the cutoff.

Assumptions you can't skip

Every observational causal estimate relies on assumptions ([Hernán and Robins 2020](#)):

Tools and the modern workflow

Summary

Small-Group Activity

Activity: Be the causal analyst (≈ 30 min)

Format: groups of 3–4. **Time:** ~ 20 min of group work + ~ 10 min report-out.

You will get a scenario. For it, your group must produce four deliverables:

Choose a scenario

Pick **one** (or your instructor will assign one):

A. Product / tech

Does adding a “**free shipping**” badge on product pages increase **purchases**? You have historical logs; badges were shown more often on popular items.

B. Health

Does a new **fitness-tracking app** reduce users’ **resting heart rate**? People who download it are already more health-conscious.

C. Education

Does an **optional tutoring program** raise **final grades**? Students self-select into tutoring, and struggling students are more likely to sign up.

D. Policy

Does a city’s **new bike-lane network** reduce **traffic accidents**? It was built in denser, wealthier neighborhoods first.

Report out

Each group takes ~2 minutes to share:

References

- [Causal Inference: What If](#) — Hernán & Robins (free PDF)
- [Causal Inference: A Primer](#) — Pearl, Glymour & Jewell
- [“A Crash Course in Good and Bad Controls”](#) — Cinelli, Forney & Pearl
- [DoWhy documentation](#) and [dagitty.net](#)

Bibliography

- Angrist, Joshua D., and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2014. *Mastering 'Metrics: The Path from Cause to Effect*. Princeton University Press.
- Card, David, and Alan B. Krueger. 1994. “Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.” *American Economic Review* 84 (4): 772–93.
- Cinelli, Carlos, Andrew Forney, and Judea Pearl. 2024. “A Crash Course in Good and Bad Controls.” *Sociological Methods & Research* 53: 1071–104.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/00491241221099552>.
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- Pearl, Judea. 2009. *Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference*. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press.
- Pearl, Judea, Madelyn Glymour, and Nicholas P. Jewell. 2016. *Causal Inference in Statistics: A Primer*. Wiley.
- Sharma, Amit, and Emre Kiciman. 2020. *DoWhy: An End-to-End Library for Causal Inference*. <https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.04216>.